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Stored-value cards are among the
most interesting payments innovations
of recent years. Balances on these cards
can typically be transferred without
involving a depository institution
directly. In this respect, the stored-value
card (SVC) represents a new form of cir-
culating bank liability reminiscent of the
bank notes that made up a large share of
the U.S. money supply in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Like bank
notes, SVCs replace coin and paper cur-
rency in retail payments, shifting the
composition of the U.S. monetary base
from government and central-bank lia-
bilities toward private bank obligations.
Substituting privately issued money for
Federal Reserve notes may have impor-
tant implications for the behavior of the
money supply because it affects bank
reserves and the interest sensitivity of
the monetary aggregates. This means
that SVCs would have to be considered
in the conduct of monetary policy. They
would also affect the federal budget
because they shift seigniorage from gov-
ernment to the private sector (see box
inside). The size of these impacts ulti-
mately will depend on market partici-
pants’ willingness to accept SVCs as
substitutes for cash and other retail pay-
ments instruments.1
This Economic Commentary draws par-
allels between SVCs and the bank notes
that circulated in the U.S. between 1863
and 1913. One important lesson from
these years was that the benefits of a uni-
form currency might emerge from the
requirement that high-quality assets back
private currency. But another important
lesson was that overly stringent backing
requirements could result in an inelastic
money supply and contribute to banking
panics.2, 3 During this period, having a
uniform currency apparently meant for-
feiting an elastic money supply. These
lessons will provide historical perspec-
tive on SVCs and other new forms of
private money.
n n   The National Banking Era
Throughout most of U.S. history, private
banks were the primary suppliers of cur-
rency. This was last true during the
National Banking Era, which began with
the passage of the National Currency
Act of 1863 and the National Banking
Act of 1864, and ended with the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. In
the intervening years, currency consisted
largely of U.S. bank notes, which were
circulating liabilities of nationally char-
tered banks.
The profitability of producing private
money influences its supply. Some
important considerations are illustrated
in table 1, a representative 1890 balance
sheet for a national bank. Most impor-
tantly, deposits of eligible U.S. govern-
ment securities provided the backing for
U.S. bank notes.4 The backing was
equal to the bonds’ market value or their
par value, whichever was less, at a rate
of 110 percent of outstanding notes
before 1900 and 100 percent afterward.5
A national bank faced a number of costs
associated with its note liabilities. It had
to pay a 1 percent tax (½ percent after
1900) on its average notes outstanding
and was responsible for the costs of issu-
ing and redeeming its notes. In addition,
after 1874 a national bank was required
to deposit an amount equal to 5 percent
of its authorized notes in a redemption
fund at the U.S. Treasury.
Profits on outstanding bank notes had
two sources. The issuing bank earned
interest on the collateral that backed 
the notes. It also earned seigniorage
because the monetary value of the bank
notes exceeded the costs of issuing
them, which included taxes and redemp-
tion costs.
In retrospect, the National Banking Act
succeeded in creating a uniform cur-
rency that was the liability of private
organizations. It was uniform in the
sense that bank customers proved indif-
ferent as to whether they held U.S. bank
notes or legal-tender notes. Furthermore,
the non-bank public accepted the notes
of any national bank in payment for
goods and services—and for deposit
withdrawals—at par with legal-tender
notes. As a result, a bank often held the
circulating notes of other national banks
as part of its liquid reserve.
The nearly perfect substitutability
between national bank notes issued by
different borrowers—and between
national bank notes and legal-tender
notes—may have resulted largely from
the quality and quantity of collateral
backing the notes. After all, the require-
ment that national bank notes be 
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government bonds effectively eliminated
the risk to noteholders of bank failures.
This de facto uniformity of bank notes,
however, came at the expense of the cur-
rency’s elasticity.6 Since the supply of
eligible bonds was fixed and their quan-
tity declined throughout the latter part of
the 1800s, it was difficult for the bank-
ing system to issue more notes when the
demand for currency increased. This
defect in the National Banking Act per-
sisted until the Aldrich–Vreeland Act
was passed in 1908, resolving the elas-
ticity problem by permitting notes to be
temporarily issued against other forms
of collateral such as state and municipal
bonds and ultimately against securities.7
n n    Stored-Value Cards
Stored-value cards are one example of a
newer, electronic form of private money
designed to substitute for cash transac-
tions. These cards carry transferable
cash-equivalent balances that may now
be reloaded at specially fitted ATM
machines and that may eventually be
reloaded at home through devices
attached to personal computers. We’ve
noted that in some respects, the cash-
equivalent balances on stored-value
cards resemble circulating bank notes.
First, unlike credit-card, debit-card, and
check transactions, the use of SVC bal-
ances does not require direct involve-
ment of a financial intermediary to ver-
ify and transmit the payment.8 In this
sense, SVCs are circulating monetary
liabilities of private banks. By eliminat-
ing depository institutions’ middleman
role in making the payments, SVCs
reduce the fixed cost of each transaction.
This makes them a feasible alternative to
cash for small-dollar transactions and
gives them the potential to replace a
range of cash transactions.9
Second, banks earn seigniorage on their
SVC balances as they did on circulating
bank notes. For fiat money like a Federal
Reserve note, seigniorage can properly
be thought of as the difference between
the income earned on the assets backing
the note and the cost of producing and
redeeming it.10 Similarly, seigniorage
on an SVC can properly be thought of as
the income earned on the assets pur-
chased by issuing the SVC balance and
the cost of creating and clearing the bal-
ance. As SVC balances displace hold-
ings of currency by the non-bank public,
seigniorage is transferred from the gov-
ernment sector to the private one. It is
worth noting, however, that the transfer
of seigniorage from the public to the pri-
vate sector is not unique to SVCs. It
occurs whenever a private monetary
instrument, such as a checking deposit or
a traveler’s check, replaces publicly
issued coin and currency in the money
holdings of the non-bank public.
The third similarity between SVCs 
and circulating bank notes involves
their impact on a bank’s balance sheet.
Panel A of table 2 presents a simplified
balance sheet for a bank with no out-
standing SVC balances. In this exam-
ple, we assume that the bank is re-
quired to hold a 10-percent reserve
against its transaction deposits and that
it has no excess reserves. Panel B
shows the same bank after depositors
have transferred $5,000 from transac-
tion deposits into SVC balances.
The total amount of bank-issued bal-
ances that can be used for transactions is
$55,000, the sum of transaction deposits
and SVC balances. However, total
reserves held by this bank have fallen by
$500, and earning assets—in this case,
securities—have risen by that amount.
Hence, just like withdrawing deposits in
the form of national bank notes, down-
loading deposit balances onto an SVC
affects the composition of a bank’s
assets and liabilities, but not the size of
its balance sheet.
n n    Implications for the Money
Supply and Monetary Policy
One possible impact of SVCs on the
money supply can be seen in the exam-
ple just given. If the non-bank public
decides to hold a substantial portion of
its transaction balances on SVCs, and if
reserve requirements are not extended
TABLE 1 BALANCE SHEET OF NATIONAL CITY BANK, CLEVELAND, 1890
Resources
Loans and discounts $1,000,636.97
Overdrafts 7,670.79
U.S. bonds to secure circulation 50,000.00
U.S. bonds to secure deposits 29,000.00
U.S. bonds on hand 0
Stocks, securities, claims, etc. 63,300.00
Due from approved reserve agents 123,559.00
Due from other national banks 73,055.29
Due from state banks and bankers 25,595.01
Bankinghouse, furniture and fixtures 0
Other real estate and mortgages owned 16,066.67
Current expenses and taxes paid 4,740.73
Premiums on U.S. bonds 0
Checks and other cash items 3,287.46
Exchanges for clearinghouse 46,318.05
Bills of other national banks 7,000.00
Fractional currency, nickels, cents 1.84
Specie 40,400.00
Legal-tender notes 41,000.00
U.S. certificates of deposit 15,000.00
Redemption fund with U.S. Treasurer 2,250.00
Due from U.S. Treasurer 3,550.00
Total $1,552,431.81
Liabilities
Capital stock paid in $250,000.00
Surplus fund 150,000.00
Undivided profits 112,457.46
National bank notes outstanding 45,000.00




Deposits of U.S. disbursing officers 0
Due to other national banks 126,966.40
Due to state banks and bankers 80,367.33
Notes and bills re-discounted 0
Bills payable  0
U.S. bond account 29,000.00
Total $1,552,431.81
SOURCE: Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, vol. 2, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1, 1890, p. 681.to such balances, the result is a perma-
nent decrease in total reserves. In the
current environment, this would rein-
force a preexisting trend toward 
depositing institutions holding lower
reserves.11 Moreover, if SVCs are
widely adopted by the non-bank public,
the balances held on them will need to
be accounted for in the monetary aggre-
gates and the conduct of monetary pol-
icy. This will be especially important if
SVC balances respond differently to
changes in interest rates than do the
monetary instruments they replace.
The history of the National Banking Era
emphasizes the importance of unifor-
mity and elasticity in the supply of
currency or money. The inelasticity
problems that developed in the U.S. cur-
rency during this period would probably
not recur if the newer, electronic forms
of private money displaced a substantial
portion of coin and Federal Reserve
notes. This is because the newer forms
of private money are not backed by a
specific asset; rather, they represent a
general claim against the issuing institu-
tion’s entire portfolio. Hence, SVC bal-
ances are not constrained by the cost and
availability of eligible collateral. This
would be true even if regulators deter-
mined that, in a legal sense, SVC bal-
ances were circulating bank notes (since
the requirement that such bank notes be
backed by eligible collateral was elimi-
nated in the technical amendments to the
Housing and Community Development
Act of 1992).12
Unfortunately, the ability to issue against
the entire asset portfolio might indirectly
entail a loss of uniformity among differ-
ent issuers’ SVC balances. There are
several reasons for this. First, SVC bal-
ances are not backed by specific collat-
eral that would effectively guarantee
their repayment. Second, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has ruled that SVC balances are not
deposits and therefore do not qualify for
federal deposit insurance.13 Under the
National Depositor Preference Law of
1993, the determination that SVC bal-
ances are not deposits further implies
that they are subordinate to depositor
and FDIC claims on a bank’s assets.14
In other words, SVC balances are riskier
than uninsured deposits. Without some
sort of government or private guarantees
of repayment, many consumers and mer-
chants would probably be reluctant to
hold the SVC balances of all but the
biggest and most creditworthy banks.
This need to distinguish among SVC
balances according to their issuers sug-
gests that greater SVC use could make
for a less uniform currency.
n n    Conclusion
Allowing SVCs to be issued against a
depository institution’s entire portfolio
of assets (rather than against eligible col-
lateral only) solves the inelasticity prob-
lem that plagued U.S. currency during
the National Banking Era. On the other
hand, since this new private money will
not be backed by the government—
either directly through deposit insurance
or indirectly by requiring banks to post
U.S. government bonds as collateral to
back SVC balances—market partici-
pants will distinguish among issuers. As
a result, many depository institutions
might only issue SVC balances that are
the liabilities of, or guaranteed by, a third
party. This already occurs in the market
for traveler’s checks, where a bank may
sell its customers checks that are the lia-
bilities of American Express. Some-
times, as with credit and debit cards, cer-
tification through recognized brand
names such as Visa and MasterCard
seems to be important, supporting the
notion that heavier SVC use could make
U.S. currency less uniform. While it is
too early to measure SVCs’ impact on
the elasticity or uniformity of the money
supply, it is not too early to begin careful
analysis of the issues.
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Seigniorage is the difference between the monetary value of coin or currency and the
cost of production. The term, from the French word for ruler, seigneur, refers to the fee
merchants paid the crown for the privilege of having their bullion converted into coin.
This fee, which was in addition to brassage (minting charges), was subtracted either
from the number of coins issued to the merchant or from their metal content.
For bank notes and fiat money, seigniorage is more correctly thought of as the profits
accruing to the issuer. These profits are the difference between the interest earned on the
assets financed by issuing currency and the costs of issuing and redeeming the notes.
SOURCES: Harold G. Moulton, Principles of Money and Banking. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1916, p. 81; and The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 4. London:








Liabilities and net worth (NW)
Transaction deposits $50,000
Other deposits 22,000












Liabilities and net worth (NW)
Transaction deposits $55,000
Other deposits 22,000




Total liabilities and NW $100,000
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